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Abstract. Today’s complex online applications often require the interaction of multiple (web) services that belong to potentially
different business entities. Interoperability is a core element of such an environment, yet not a straightforward one due to the lack
of common data semantics. The problem is often approached by means of standardization procedures in a top-down manner with
limited adoption in practice. (De facto) standards for semantic interoperability most commonly emerge in a bottom-up approach,
i.e., involving the interaction and information exchange among self-interested industrial agents. In this paper, we argue that the
emergence of semantic interoperability can be seen as an economic process among rational agents and, although interoperability
can be mutually beneficial for the involved parties, it may also be costly and might fail to emerge. As a sample scenario,
we consider the emergence of semantic interoperability among rational web service agents in service-oriented architectures
(SOAs), and we analyze their individual economic incentives with respect to utility, risk and cost. We model this process as a
positive-sum game and study its equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics. According to our analysis, which is also experimentally
verified, certain conditions on the communication cost, the cost of technological adaptation, the expected mutual benefit from
interoperability, as well as the expected loss from isolation, drive the process.
Keywords: Semantic interoperability, incentives, game theory, schema mappings, consensus
1. Introduction
Today’s emerging complex online applications of-
ten require the orchestration of multiple web services
that potentially belong to different business entities
and can be assumed to be provided by autonomous
agents. According to the service-oriented architecture
(SOA) design principles, services should be flexible
in order to discover, select, and use other services for
fulfilling a given task and goal [24]. Service inter-
action can be achieved by syntactic interoperability,
whereas conformance to the service roles in the ser-
vice orchestration pertains to semantic interoperability
[5]. Semantic interoperability refers to the ability to ex-
change data with unambiguous shared meaning. Stan-
dardization efforts have a long history dealing with
*Corresponding author. E-mail: vakili@irandoc.ac.ir.
syntactic interoperability, whereas semantic interoper-
ability is still open and mainly dealt with by ontology
alignment, schema mapping and attribute correspon-
dence approaches [40]. Apart from the technical chal-
lenges for achieving semantic interoperability, it of-
ten emerges as a bottom-up dynamic decision-making
process among self-interested industrial agents, and it
involves costly information exchange and technolog-
ical adaptation for conformance to the agreed stan-
dards [1]. Bottom-up approaches have been already
proposed in the web-service community, by study-
ing the notion of folksonomies, or emergent behavior
of agents. In this era, it is often assumed that stan-
dardization means conformance to W3C or other sim-
ilar formats, such as XML Schema, WSDL, SOAP,
BEPL4WS, rather than the notion of ontological agree-
ment or canonical dictionaries for given domains. The
benefits from adopting standards [10], as well as the
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decision-making process regarding the optimal timing
for the adoption of a new standard [12], have also been
well studied. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the dynamic process of reaching a distributed agree-
ment towards a standard among rational agents has not
been analyzed.
In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic approach
to analyze the individual incentives among rational
agents for decision-making towards the emergence of
semantic agreement.1 As a running example, we con-
sider the real problem of achieving semantic interop-
erability for web-service composition in the SOA con-
text among rational service agents that employ differ-
ent schemas (or ontologies) to describe their interfaces.
Service agents that employ a common schema (or on-
tology) and seek to utilize services from other agents
that employ a different schema (or ontology) have to
collectively reach local semantic mappings (or align-
ments) between the two schemas (or ontologies) of
acceptably-high quality, through costly iterative com-
munication and mapping re-adjustment. If a seman-
tic agreement is reached (i.e., semantic mappings of
acceptably-high quality have been found), a benefit is
expected to be mutually enjoyed by the service agents
involved in the semantic mapping creation process,
whereas a loss is expected for the rest of the agents
due to their semantic isolation. We model this process
as a constant positive-sum game and study its evolu-
tionary dynamics in order to find the conditions upon
which semantic agreement can emerge as a bottom-
up process among rational agents. We identify as the
most important parameters for the emergence of an
agreement on semantic mappings: (i) the expected ben-
efit from achieving semantic interoperability, (ii) the
cost of technological adaptation to the agreed seman-
tic mapping, (iii) the expected semantic isolation cost,
and (iv) the minimum required quality of the schema
mapping for achieving agreement. The conditions for
reaching semantic agreement as an evolutionary sta-
ble strategy (ESS) are identified and verified by sim-
ulation experiments. Our modeling can be applied in
more general distributed settings for achieving seman-
tic interoperability among rational agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we describe our running example. In Sec-
1A short and preliminary version of this work was published
in [39]. The current work has been significantly enriched with a
comprehensive running example, with improved analysis and result
proofs, with comprehensive experiments and with a more detailed
review of the related work.
tion 3, we model the decentralized decision making
on adopting/rejecting semantic mappings as a game
and then find the conditions for the beneficial equi-
librium. Also, we model the decentralized decision-
making process for advertisement of partial semantic
mappings. In Section 4, we revisit the game model of
Section 3 and analyze it as a Bayesian game according
to the updated belief on reaching consensus. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we discuss on equilibrium selection in the
Bayesian game for semantic convergence. In Section 5,
we numerically evaluate our results (Section 5.1) and
we verify our analytical results with simulation exper-
iments (Section 5.2). In Section 6 we discuss the re-
lated work and finally, in Section 7, we conclude our
work.
2. The running example
We focus on a specific problem in semantic inter-
operability as a sample scenario that will be used as
a running example throughout the paper. The purpose
of this sample scenario is to address similar seman-
tic interoperability problems encountered in real set-
tings and applications of web services (e.g., [23,41]) or
among different business entities. We consider a sys-
tem of distributed service repositories where service
providers register their service interfaces. At a registry,
service descriptions are represented, based on a spe-
cific structured schema. Our problem is how to achieve
semantic interoperability in a web service composition
example.
Interoperability between any two sets of service
providers registered in two different registries requires
the existence of semantic mappings (or alignments)
between their corresponding schemas (or ontologies),
e.g., XML schemas. For example, to constitute a value-
added social-event ticketing service, a profile man-
agement web service at the first registry is combined
with a ticket management service and a pdf gener-
ation service at the second registry, as depicted in
Fig. 1(a). Thus, semantic interoperability increases the
business potential for the service agents at either reg-
istry. A sample mapping (alignment) between the on-
tologies of Registries 1 and 2 is depicted in Fig. 1(b).
The formalism of such schema mappings is beyond the
scope of our work and, without loss of generality, sim-
ple attribute correspondences can be assumed [16]. For
example, (Purchase.person.User.firstname = Transac-
tion.customer.Customer.name), or (Purchase.when =
Transaction.date) that are given as XML path cor-
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Fig. 1. a) The sample scenario. b) A sample mapping. c) The match-
ing process.
respondences (the dot syntax can be assumed either
an is-a relationship or a subclass relationship) are in-
stances of attribute correspondences between the on-
tologies in Fig. 1(b). More formally, in the ontology
alignment domain [16], a correspondence (or partial
mapping here) between two ontologies O and O ′, is
a 5-uple < id, e, e′, r, n > such that id is an iden-
tifier of the correspondence, e and e′ are entities of
O and O ′ (e.g. XML elements, concepts), r is a re-
lation (e.g. equivalence (=), more general (>=), dis-
jointness (! =)), and n is a confidence measure typ-
ically in [0, 1]. Semantic mapping or alignment be-
tween ontologies O and O ′ is a set of correspondences
(or partial mappings) on O and O ′, with some addi-
tional metadata (e.g. multiplicity: 1–1, 1–*, method,
date, properties, etc.). By a semantic mapping between
the schema of the first registry to that of the second
one, the service agents at the first registry can employ
the services of the agents at the second registry.
Any subset of the service providers that are regis-
tered at the same registry can communicate to each
other, for example in ebXML architecture [14]. Se-
mantic interoperability in this setting is established by
a consensus among the set of service providers, regis-
tered at one registry, on the acceptable quality of the
schema mapping that is going to be used in their col-
laboration with another set in the system. This consen-
sus is mutually beneficial for all the service agents at
the registry, as the more the agents that reach a schema
mapping of high quality are, the higher the business
potential for collectively constructing complex value-
added services with service agents from the second
registry is.
As a matching process, we assume a parallel compo-
sition scenario (depicted in Fig. 1(c)), as follows: Ini-
tially, each agent employs a separate matcher (e.g. S-
Match, OLA, COMA++, etc.) with its own parameters
(provided by experts) and resources, and it produces
an individual mapping of limited effectiveness. Then,
agents exchange partial mappings with each other
(through costly communication) and gradually con-
verge to a new mapping of improved quality through
aggregation and filtering of partial mappings. In the
aggregation and filtering process, we assume that each
agent, upon receiving a partial mapping, is able (us-
ing one of the quality metrics in [17]) to evaluate
whether replacing its corresponding local partial map-
ping leads to an improvement in the schema mapping
quality. Moreover, a certain partial mapping might vi-
olate a 1-to-1 constraint in the local schema map-
ping or lead to an inconsistency by creating incorrect
attribute-correspondence circles. On one hand, adopt-
ing a new partial mapping might involve future costs
for the agent (e.g. for the implementation and the sys-
tem integration of this mapping), when the schema
mapping is materialized. On the other hand, keeping
a heterogeneous schema mapping can result in mar-
ket losses due to semantic isolation. In this economic
process, two different equilibria may emerge depend-
ing on the agents’ decisions. In the first one, the agents
keep their heterogeneous schema mappings of low
quality, as they fail to collaboratively build schema
mappings of high quality, as opposed to the second
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one, where they achieve semantic interoperability by
having reached a consensus on schema mappings of
acceptably-high quality. Thus, the emergence of se-
mantic interoperability can be viewed as a decentral-
ized coordination problem for finding an agreement
among rational agents on the quality of their mapping
to another schema.2 The complexity of the coordina-
tion problem results from imposing two important con-
straints: (i) The service agents are self-interested and
profit seekers; and (ii) they exchange partial mappings
through local communications (i.e., limited-scope ad-
vertisements of partial mappings). To tackle the prob-
lem, we develop a decentralized strategy in order to co-
ordinate autonomous agents, with respect to their ratio-
nality and local communication. Then, we investigate
under which conditions the consensus does emerge in
such an economic process.
3. Decentralized strategy
In this section, we develop a decentralized strat-
egy to coordinate the rational decisions of autonomous
agents for collectively constructing a schema mapping
of acceptable quality based on local communications.
We denote as P the service agents that are registered
at a registry R and they use the schema S to express
their services. An advertised partial mapping μ can be
understood as an attribute mapping between the source
schema S and a destination schema S′; e.g. A → B
and A → C are two instances of partial mapping μ,
where A ∈ S and B,C ∈ S′.
We refer to the fraction of the agents that reach
agreement on a certain minimum acceptable quality
of a schema mapping as the consensus level for that
schema mapping. The consensus level is generally un-
known, and thus we model it as a random variable
 ∈ [0, 1]. As different instances of the schema map-
ping have different qualities, we also model the quality
of the schema mapping with another random variable
Q ∈ [0, 1]. The probability distribution of these ran-
dom variables is discussed later in this section. To fa-
cilitate the decision making analysis, we employ a dis-
crete random variable  on the consensus state that is
2Note that, after agreement, agents might still possess different
mappings, but of individually acceptable qualities. Different agents
might have different preferences regarding the acceptable quality of
their schema mapping that they rationally pursue.
Table 1
The notation used in developing the decentralized strategy
Symbol Description
Q The random variable associated with the quality of the
schema mapping
 The random variable on the consensus state
 The random variable associated with the consensus level
φ0 The consensus level threshold that is sufficient for the
agreement
a1, a2 Two choices upon receiving an instance of mapping:
a1: reject, a2: adopt
b The marginal benefit of adopting the received instances
of; mapping if a consensus is finally established
ca The adoption cost incurred for schema mapping
modification, implementation and system integration
ch The heterogeneity cost due to the market losses for an
agent that does not possess a high quality mapping as
compared to other agents
γ The ratio of the adaptation cost to the sum of the benefit
and the heterogeneity cost
cadv The cost incurred for each time of advertising an
instance of the mapping
X The random variable associated with the estimated
current quality of the schema mapping of other agents
r(.) The risk associated with the advertisement or not of a
particular mapping
based on , as follows:
θφ =
{
θ1; φ ∈ [0, φ0)
θ2; φ ∈ [φ0, 1] (1)
where φ0 is the consensus level threshold that is suf-
ficient for the agreement. According to the definition
of θ , the set of all possible states of the uncertain pa-
rameter is θ1, no consensus and θ2, consensus. There-
fore, we define that a consensus on quality of the
schema mapping is established when at least φ0 pro-
portion of the service agents P reach an agreement
on a certain minimum quality of it. The decentralized
strategy will be developed in the following subsec-
tions: to guide the decisions of autonomous agents on
advertising their partial mappings, on one hand, and on
adopting the received advertisements, on the other.
3.1. Adoption
The received instance of a mapping μ is taken into
consideration by a rational agent if it results in a
schema mapping of higher quality, as compared to the
one currently used (by employing one of the quality
metrics in [17], e.g., average string similarity); other-
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wise it will be ignored without further decision anal-
ysis. To guide the rational decisions of the agents, the
decentralized strategy is developed based on a deci-
sion model that is constructed in accordance with the
expected individual utility maximization. Each agent
has two choices upon receiving an instance of map-
ping μ that results in a more qualified schema map-
ping: a1: reject, or a2: adopt it. The uncertain parame-
ter that affects the decision process is the state of con-
sensus on quality of the schema mapping. Then, an
agent will gain a utility u(a|θ) according to its action
a and depending on the eventually-realized state of the
consensus θ .
Semantic interoperability is considered to be mutu-
ally beneficial for the service agents if they agree on
an acceptable quality of the schema mapping; thus, b
is defined to represent the marginal benefit of adopt-
ing each of the received instances of μ if a consen-
sus is finally established.3 Meanwhile, a costly effort
ca should be exerted by the agent for the eventual
implementation and system integration of the partial
mapping μ. In general, ca can be different for dif-
ferent partial mappings, but we assume it to be con-
stant for modeling simplicity. Also, in general, b and
ca can be different for different agents for the same
mapping, because, for example, high-quality schema
mappings might have different benefits for different
agents, and more or less effort might be required for
the implementation of a particular partial mapping.
We experimentally consider this case in Section 5. If
an agent adopts the received instance of partial map-
ping μ and a consensus is reached, he gains a utility
b − ca ; otherwise, the outcome is only a loss of the
value ca , as he still incurs the adoption cost for at-
tempting interoperability (i.e., schema mapping modi-
fication, schema mapping implementation design), yet
without getting any benefit from it. On the contrary,
if an agent rejects a mapping that others have collec-
tively found it acceptable, then while he should not ex-
pect any benefit from interoperability, he should also
pay a heterogeneity cost; this cost results from his ex-
pected market losses from his semantic isolation. We
denote ch as the marginal cost of heterogeneity ex-
pected to be incurred. Last, in the case that an agent
rejects a received instance of μ and there is eventu-
ally no consensus, then no cost or benefit occurs and
3The marginal benefit b can be calculated by dividing the total
benefit of having a high-quality mapping divided by the estimated
number of mappings that should be adopted for reaching the accept-
able quality.
Fig. 2. The strategic form of the game.
thus no utility is obtained. To summarize, the util-
ity function4 u from the adoption decision process is
given by
u(a|θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
b − ca; a = a2, θ = θ2
0; a = a1, θ = θ1
−ch; a = a1, θ = θ2
−ca; a = a2, θ = θ1
(2)
This decision-making process can be modeled as a
positive-sum game among rational agents with respect
to their derived utilities. For clarity, the strategic form
of this game is depicted in Fig. 2.
Based on Nash equilibrium analysis, there will
be two equilibria5 constituted in {(ai2, a−i2 )|θ2} and
{(ai1, a−i1 )|θ1} where ai is the action of an individ-
ual pi and a−i is the action of the other agents
pj ∈ P , pj = pi . Although the first equilibrium
is Pareto-efficient and achieves semantic interoper-
ability (as in this case, a certain (φ0) proportion of
agents reach an agreement on an acceptable quality of
the schema mapping), a natural question arises about
which equilibrium will be chosen by the system. It de-
pends on the state of θ and the probability distribu-
tion of π(θ) that should actually be obtained. It can
be concluded from maximum entropy priority6 [9] that
4The utility function of agents is the base for their “iterative” de-
cision making process, and hence it does not capture one-time costs
paid by all the agents, such as the cost of generating the mapping.
This kind of cost is part of the initialization costs and does not affect
the dynamics of the process.
5A Nash equilibrium is an action profile with the property that
no single player can obtain a higher payoff by deviating unilaterally
from this profile.
6In Bayesian probability, the principle of maximum entropy is
a postulate that states that, subject to known constraints (called
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π(φ) = U [α, β] where α = 0 and β = 1, in order
to model a prior distribution for φ as non-informative
as possible. Then, the probability distribution of θ is
given by
π(θ) =
{
φ0; θ = θ1
1 − φ0; θ = θ2
According to the Bayes decision principle [9], a ratio-
nal agent’s decision maximizes ρ(a, π), where ρ is the
Bayesian expected utility and is defined as
ρ(a, π) = Eπ [u(a|θ)] = ∑
θi∈
u(a|θi)π(θi) (3)
Therefore, to make an optimal decision and choose the
action a that maximizes ρ(a, π), the expected utility
of a1: reject and a2: adopt is assessed respectively by
each agent:
Eπ
[
u(a1|θ)
] = u(a1|θ1)·π(θ1) + u(a1|θ2)·π(θ2)
= 0 × φ0 + (−ch) × (1 − φ0)
= −ch(1 − φ0)
Eπ
[
u(a2|θ)
] = u(a2|θ1)·π(θ1) + u(a2|θ2)·π(θ2)
= (−ca)×φ0 + (b− ca)× (1 −φ0)
= b(1 − φ0) − ca
Finally, setting Eπ [u(a1|θ)] = Eπ [u(a2|θ)] will re-
sult in
b + ch
ca
= 1
1 − φ0 (4)
For convenience, we define gamma as the ratio of the
adaptation cost of a partial mapping to the sum of its
benefit and the heterogeneity cost, i.e.,
γ ≡ ca
b + ch
To this end, it can be concluded that, when a received
instance of mapping μ is taken under consideration by
a rational agent pi ∈ P , it is rejected if γi > (1 − φ0)
and adopted if γi < (1 − φ0); where threshold of φ0
can be defined to have the same value for all the par-
ticipating agents or it can be set by individual agents to
testable information), the probability distribution that best represents
the current state of knowledge is the one with largest entropy.
different values.7 If the decision analysis results in a1
as the Bayes action in more than (1 − φ0) percent of
agents, then it is impossible to reach an agreement on
an acceptable quality of the schema mapping; because
in this case, with reference to (1), the proportion of the
agents that would prefer to keep and use their current
instances of the schema mapping would be too high to
achieve a consensus on the quality. Therefore:
Result I. The necessary condition for existence of the
Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the system is that at
least φ0 percent of agents pi ∈ P conclude γi <
(1 − φ0).
The interpretation of this result is that semantic in-
teroperability does emerge in the system only if, in φ0
percent of the agents pi ∈ P , the γi (the ratio of adop-
tion cost to the cost and benefit of interoperability) is
less than 1 − φ0. To clarify this through an example,
suppose a collaboration scenario in which, the thresh-
old φ0 is determined to be 0.75 according to the re-
quirements of the services provided by the agents, then
for at least 75 percent of the rational agents, the in-
centive of interoperability (in terms of their b and ch)
should be four times their adoption cost; only then it
would be possible to achieve a consensus.
3.2. Communication
In this section, we develop the advertisement deci-
sion-making model of the decentralized strategy based
on individual risk minimization. As will be discussed,
the advertisements of partial mappings significantly af-
fect the agents’ local perception of the level that the
global consensus has been reached, hence their indi-
vidual Bayesian decision process for the adoption of
the partial mappings that they receive.
There is always a risk (defined as the expected loss
in [0, 1]) associated with the advertisement of a par-
tial mapping. The advertised partial mapping will be
ignored by the receiver agents, if it does not result in
a more qualified schema mapping. In such a case, the
agent has a cost of cadv for the required communication
and for externalizing internal knowledge.8 A receiv-
ing cost is also anticipated in the communication cost,
however here, we focus on the sending cost, because
this is the dominant cost component. There is also an
7We experimentally investigate the latter setting in the evaluation
section.
8Such a cost would be reasonable (under rationality assumptions)
for locally-generated mappings that incur a certain generation cost.
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opportunity cost from not advertising a given map-
ping; this cost is due to the probability of not reaching
a consensus due to not advertising a partial mapping
of high quality.9 In other words, if a consensus is ex-
pected to be reached, then the advertisement cost is ex-
pected to be a justified investment cost. In the case that
a consensus is not expected to be reached, the adop-
tion cost ca for the current instance of the local partial
mapping is considered to be a loss. Thus, the risk of
advertising can be modeled as the probability of not
reaching the consensus, and the risk of not advertis-
ing can be modeled as the probability of reaching the
consensus. Assuming that the agents are risk averse
with respect to their advertisement actions, if the ex-
pected loss from not advertising a certain partial map-
ping is greater than that due to the advertisement, then
the agent should advertise it. Formally, assuming a de-
cision space  = {δ2, δ1} for advertisement, where δ2
and δ1 respectively correspond to advertising or not a
given partial mapping μ, the agent chooses δ2 if the
following condition is true:
cadv· r(δ2) < ca · r(δ1) (5)
where cadv is the advertisement cost, ca is the adoption
cost, and r(.) is the risk associated with the advertise-
ment or not of a particular partial mapping.
According to Eq. (5), the agents decide to adver-
tise a partial mapping or not based on their local be-
lief on the probability of reaching the consensus. In
this section, we assume this belief to be fixed, regard-
less of the information that becomes available to the
agent on the achieved level of the consensus. If π de-
notes the probability of reaching the consensus, then
it is r(δ1) = π = 1 − r(δ2); thus, the advertisement
policy that is derived from (5) is fixed over time. More
specifically, as we found in the previous section, the
probability of reaching the consensus is π = 1 − φ0.
Evaluating r(δ1) and r(δ2) in Eq. (5), the optimal ad-
vertisement rule δ∗ is determined with respect to φ0 by
the following formula:
δ∗ =
{
δ1; cadvca >
1−φ0
φ0
δ2; cadvca <
1−φ0
φ0
(6)
Note that, if cadv/ca = 1 − φ0/φ0, then the agent
is indifferent between advertising or not and randomly
9In the rest of paper, by quality of a partial mapping we mean, the
quality of the schema mapping that results from making use of this
partial mapping.
selects δ1 or δ2. To this end, advertising or not the
partial schema mappings depends on the relative costs
cadv, ca and the consensus level threshold φ0.
4. Bayesian analysis of decentralized strategy
In this section, we will demonstrate how the devel-
oped strategy provides the sufficient condition and re-
duces the already found necessary condition for the
emergence of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. This is
achieved by employing the information that becomes
locally available through advertisement of partial map-
pings in the individual decisions of the autonomous
agents.
4.1. Adoption
In this section, we employ the conditional Bayes de-
cision principle in the decision model of the decentral-
ized strategy. According to this principle, every agent
assesses its expected utility from the adoption or the
rejection of an advertisement, with respect to the be-
lieved distribution of φ at the time of decision mak-
ing. Let us consider the snapshot of the estimated cur-
rent quality of the schema mapping of the rest of agent
community based on the received sample of the partial
mappings. This quality snapshot can be seen as a ran-
dom variable X with probability distribution f (x) that
depends on the consensus level φ.
Theorem I. The quality Q and the consensus level 
of the schema mapping are equal in distribution.
Proof. Agents advertise mappings of high quality
among the ones that they possess. Recall that the con-
sensus level  is the fraction of the agents that have
reached a minimum quality threshold. Therefore, a low
average quality x of advertised mappings reveals a low
fraction of agents that have reached a minimum ac-
ceptable quality. As x increases, so does the consensus
level, and hence Q and  are equal in distribution:
∀x ∈ [0, 1], P (Q  x) = P(  x) (7)
Taking advantage of the information that becomes
available through advertisements, the distribution π(φ)
becomes the posterior distribution π(φ|x). This distri-
bution reflects the updated belief of a participant on the
global consensus level of the schema mapping, after
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observing the sample x through the advertisement of
partial mappings.
To this end, the uniform distribution of φ over 0 and
1 is revised to model π(φ|x). The upper bound of the
posterior distribution remains 1. However, the lower
bound of π(φ|x) is set to α, where based on the equal-
ity of  and Q in distribution, α can be considered
by individual agents as the minimum quality of the
schema mapping after employing the received adver-
tisements. Therefore, the believed probability distribu-
tion of θ at the time of decision making is assessed by
individual agents as follows:
π∗(θ) =
{
(φ0 − α)/(1 − α); θ = θ1
(1 − φ0)/(1 − α); θ = θ2
where π(θ |x) is denoted by π∗(θ). Based on the value
of α, two different cases can be distinguished, specifi-
cally:
(i) if 0 < α < φ0, then the expected utilities are as-
sessed in accordance with Bayesian expected utility
formula:
Eπ
∗[
u(a1|θ)
] = −ch(1 − φ0)/(1 − α)
Eπ
∗[
u(a2|θ)
] = b(1 − φ0)/(1 − α) − ca (8)
With reference to Bayes decision principle (in Sec-
tion 3.1), an optimal decision maximizes ρ(a, π∗).
Eπ
∗ [u(a1|θ)] and Eπ∗ [u(a2|θ)] are monotonic func-
tions of α that are strictly decreasing and increas-
ing respectively. Therefore, to determine the Bayes
action aπ∗ , we should find the crosspoint at which
Eπ
∗ [U(a1|θ)] = Eπ∗ [U(a2|θ)]. From the latter, after
some algebra, we obtain that
(1 − α)γ = (1 − φ0) (9)
Thus, in this case, when a received instance of a partial
mapping is considered by a rational agent pi ∈ P , it
is rejected if γi (1 − αi) > (1 − φ0) and adopted if
γi (1 − αi) < (1 − φ0). As discussed in Section 3,
if the decision analysis results in aπ∗ = a1 in more
than (1−φ0) percent of service agents, it is impossible
to reach an agreement over the quality of the schema
mapping. Therefore:
Result II. The necessary condition for the existence
of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is that at least φ0
percent of agents pi ∈ P conclude that γi (1 − αi) <
(1 − φ0).
From a simple comparison of results I and II it is
derived that the necessary condition for the existence
of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is reduced by a fac-
tor (1 − α) in the developed strategy; how the suffi-
cient condition to this equilibrium is provided by this
strategy is discussed in the next section.
(ii) if φ0  α  1, then in this case the probability
distribution of θ is reduced to:
π∗(θ) =
{
0; θ = θ1
1; θ = θ2
Obviously in this case, the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
has been selected or, equivalently, semantic interop-
erability has emerged. Here, an agent can stop the
adoption decision process (i.e. the result of the deci-
sion analysis would be certainly adoption), as a cer-
tain quality of schema mapping (φ0) has already been
achieved.
4.2. Communication
To benefit from the information that becomes avail-
able on the achieved consensus level in the advertise-
ment decision model established in (5), the quality of
the received partial mappings is taken into account
for updating the probability of reaching the consensus,
as already explained in Section 4.1. For risk formu-
lation, we consider the snapshot of the estimated cur-
rent quality of the schema mappings of other agents,
as inferred based on the quality of the received sample
of the partial mappings. Recall that the quality of the
schema mappings at the other agents, as locally esti-
mated by the received advertisements, is represented
by the random variable X with probability distribution
f (x). Whereas the quality of the schema mapping of
the agent community and the consensus level are equal
in distribution, x can be considered to be independent
from φ, because the received partial mappings are a
random sample of the overall partial mappings. Thus,
f (x|φ) = π(φ). The Bayes risk of an advertisement
decision δ, with respect to a prior distribution π on φ,
is defined by an expected loss in [0,1] based on aver-
aging over the random variable X [9] as follows:
r(δ) = EπEx[L(φ, δ)] (10)
where L(φ, δ) is the loss function of advertisement ac-
cording to the consensus level and can be developed
from utility theory [9] as follows.
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Let x0 denote the quality of local schema mapping
that results from using the instance of μ, which is sub-
ject to be advertised or not. We consider L(.) to be in
[0, 1] where, the choice of this interval serves only to
set the scale for L. Given the assumption that the loss
depends on the probability that an advertised mapping
is adopted by other agents, the highest and the low-
est losses are associated with δ2 (advertising) and δ1
(not advertising), respectively, when the relative qual-
ity of x0 to x is low. More specifically, if kx0 < x,
then L(δ2) = 1 and vice versa L(δ1) = 0; where k is a
tolerance factor that can be defined as a statistic metric
on the resulting quality of the local schema mapping
based on the received advertisements.
When kx0 > x, the higher the quality of the instance
is, the lower the probability that other agents will ig-
nore the advertisement and the less the loss will be.
Therefore, in this case, we assume L(δ1) = x0 and
L(δ2) = 1 − x0. To this end, L(.) is given by
L
(
φ, δ1(x)
) =
{
x0; x < kx0
0; x  kx0,
L
(
φ, δ2(x)
) =
{
1 − x0; x < kx0
1; x  kx0
To determine the decision variable δ, the risk of each
advertisement rule δ1 and δ2 is assessed in accordance
with Eq. (10) as follows:
r(δ1) = Eφ
[∫
L
(
φ, δ1(x)
)
dFX(x|φ)
]
=
∫ kx0
0
x0dx = kx20
r(δ2) =
∫ kx0
0
(1 − x0)dx +
∫ 1
kx0
dx = 1 − kx20
where dFX(x|φ) = π(φ)dx. Therefore, by applying
r(δ1) and r(δ2) in Eq. (5), the optimal advertisement
rule δ∗ is determined by individual agents:
δ∗ =
{
δ1; x0  x∗
δ2; x0 > x∗ (11)
where x∗ = {cadv/((cadv + ca)· k)}1/2.
In summary, every autonomous service agent is
guided by the developed strategy to decide whether to
adopt or reject an advertisement, with respect to its
local perception of the global consensus level; mean-
while, the local perception of π(φ) is estimated by tak-
ing advantage of the information that becomes avail-
able through local advertisements. In the next section,
we investigate if following the strategy leads the sys-
tem into the Pareto-efficient equilibrium and to the
emergence of semantic interoperability.
4.3. Equilibrium selection
In the employed game models, we investigate the
necessary conditions that should be held in order adopt
– a received instance of a partial mapping μ – to be
selected as a dominant strategy. However, in general,
all choosing reject could also emerge as an equilibrium
in the system. In the case that multiple equilibria ex-
ist, one way that one of them can finally emerge is to
become a focal point on which the expectations of the
players (participating agents) converge; this focal equi-
librium could be determined by some process of pre-
play communication [15]. In the developed strategy,
the agents can become focused on one of the equilib-
ria through the communication mechanism proposed
in Section 3.2.
As mentioned, in the proposed advertisement mech-
anism, a rational agent avoids advertising its instance
of mapping μ when it has a high probability of be-
ing ignored by others. According to the definition10
of α, it is reasonable to assume that in such a set-
ting the expected value of α by individual agents
gradually increases; hence, the decentralized strategy
has the potential to focus the attention of agents on
the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We can also give a
new interpretation to (9), stating the necessary condi-
tion for the existence of the Pareto-efficient equilib-
rium in the Bayesian game with respect to α. Specif-
ically, the dominant strategy aπ∗ for the agents is
given by
aπ
∗ =
{
a1; α  α∗
a2; α > α∗, (12)
where α∗ = 1 − (1 − φ0)γ−1.
In other words, the necessary condition for the emer-
gence of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is that the
assessment of αi , based on the local observations of
10Recall that α is considered by individual agents, as the mini-
mum quality of the schema mapping results from using the received
advertisements on μ.
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the participating agents pi ∈ P on the quality of the
schema mapping, satisfies αi > α∗. Therefore:
Result III. The necessary and sufficient conditions for
the Pareto-efficient equilibrium by the developed strat-
egy are γ < (1 − φ0)/(1 − α) and that the sequential
schema quality increments, denoted by α, satisfy
α  ζ
(
1 − α∗)(1 − γ ) (13)
for some constant ζ with 0 < ζ < 1.
As analyzed in Section 4, γ < (1 − φ0)/(1 − α) is
the necessary condition for the adopt strategy to be a
Nash equilibrium of the game. However, in order for
the consensus (i.e., Pareto-efficient equilibrium) to be
reached, it should also be α  ζ(1 − α∗)(1 − γ ).
Based on the geometric improvement theorem from
[3], it can be proved that in this case α → φ0; hence,
the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is achieved (as dis-
cussed in Section 4.1, situation (ii)). Regarding the
proof of Eq. (13), suppose that α∗ is the initial value of
α, αi is the value of α at the ith iteration, and αM the
maximum value. In our setting, α∗ = 1 − (1 − φ0)/γ ,
and αM = 1. According to the geometric improvement
theorem, if our developed strategy guarantees that for
every iteration i, αi+1 − αi  ζ(αM − α∗) for some
constant 0 < ζ < 1, then it terminates after at most
2 log(αM − α∗)/ζ iterations.
αi+1 − αi  ζ (αM − α∗)
= ζ
(
φ0 − 1 + 1 − φ0
γ
)
 ζ
(
φ0
(
1 − γ−1)− (1 − γ−1))
= ζ(1 − φ0)
(
γ−1 − 1)
= ζ
(
1 − φ0
γ
)
(1 − γ )
= ζ (1 − α∗)(1 − γ )
that is Eq. (13). When α tends to φ0, the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium becomes a focal point on which
the expectations of the service agents converge. Re-
sult III is verified in the experimental results of Sec-
tion 5.
The above statements are also supported by studying
the trajectories of the strategies (adoption or rejection)
followed by the agents with respect to the observed
quality of the schema mapping. Considering that the
successful strategy spreads among the agents with re-
spect to the quality of the schema mapping through a
proportional imitation rule,11 we employ the replicator
dynamics equation [32] for the game among homoge-
neous agents, which is given by
x˙i
xi
= Vi − V¯ (14)
where xi is the fraction of agents play strategy i,
x˙ is the derivative of x with respect to time, Vi =
Eπ
∗ [U(ai |θ)] is the expected payoff of pure strategy i
and V¯ is the average expected payoff by all strategies.
Assuming that a fraction x1 of the agents play reject
and x2 = 1−x1 of them play adopt, then the per capita
increase of x1 over time is given by
x˙1
x1
= (Eπ∗[U(a1|θ)]− Eπ∗[U(a2|θ)])(1 − x1)
= (ca − [1 − φ0]/[1 − α][b − ch])(1 − x1)
(15)
Adopt is an evolutionary stable strategy12 (ESS) of
the system when
x˙1/x1 ≤ 0 ⇔ γ (1−α) < 1−φ0, ∀x1 ∈ [0, 1]
(16)
In other words, if γ (1 − α) < 1 − φ0 for the partici-
pants, then the system will asymptotically converge to
the equilibrium where every agent adopts a received
instance of an attribute mapping, which results in a
more qualified schema mapping. For a system of het-
erogeneous agents, the system would still asymptoti-
cally evolve to the same equilibrium where every agent
pi plays adopt as long as γi(1 − αi) < 1 − φ0, as
proved in the next section by simulation experiments.
In this case, the consensus on the quality of the schema
mapping is achieved if the expected value of αi also
increases gradually (as stated formally in (13)) during
the adoption process.
11With a proportional imitation rule in a game, which effectively
says: “imitate actions that perform better, with a probability propor-
tional to the expected gain”, we can use the usual replicator dynam-
ics [22].
12An evolutionarily stable strategy [28] (ESS) is a strategy which,
if adopted by a population of players, cannot be invaded by any al-
ternative strategy that is initially rare.
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Fig. 3. Expected strategy payoffs of the Bayesian game for b = 1,
ca = ch = 0.1b, φ0 = 0.9.
5. Evaluation results
In this section, we first evaluate the results of our
analysis through a numerical example for better clar-
ity. Then, we setup a set of experiments to verify how
well the simulation tracks the predicted results of our
theoretical analysis in different simulated settings.
5.1. Numerical example
We first consider a homogeneous system of agents
with semantically diverse schema mappings, where the
marginal adoption cost ca is assumed to be 10% of the
per-agent marginal benefit b, when the consensus is
reached, the marginal cost of heterogeneity ch equals
the adoption cost and the consensus quality threshold
φ0 is considered to be high and equal to φ0 = 0.9 (see
Section 3.1 for detailed description of the cost and ben-
efit parameters). The strategy (adoption and rejection)
payoffs are depicted in Fig. 3 for various values of α
that is proxy of the consensus level reached. As the fig-
ure shows, adopting an advertisement that results in a
more qualified schema mapping, is the dominant strat-
egy for agents, if the cost of adoption is relatively low.
Furthermore, the dominant strategy is determined re-
gardless of the locally observed quality of the schema
mappings, which results from using the received ad-
vertisements in this case. In this example, when the
cost of adoption is higher than 10% of b, e.g., ca =
0.4b whereas still ch = 0.1b, and the consensus quality
threshold is lower than 0.9, e.g., φ0 = 0.7, as depicted
in Fig. 4, the strategy payoffs would have a crosspoint
at α∗  0.18. Specifically, according to Eq. (12) and
compatible to Eq. (16), with the mentioned values of
cost and benefit, a quality greater than a∗ = 0.18 for
the schema mapping, relative to the specified consen-
Fig. 4. Expected strategy payoffs of the Bayesian game for b = 1,
ca = 0.4b, ch = 0.1b, φ0 = 0.7.
Fig. 5. Strategy evolutionary dynamics for b = 1, ca = 0.4b,
ch = 0.1b, φ0 = 0.7 and α = 0.1.
sus quality threshold, should be estimated locally by
individual agents in order for the strategy adopt to have
a payoff higher than the reject one.
Next, we further analyze the effect of the locally-
estimated level of consensus, based on the received
advertisements, by means of evolutionary strategy dy-
namics. We consider the above homogeneous system
with parameters b = 1, ca = 0.4b, ch = 0.1b,
φ0 = 0.7, where a fraction x1 of participating agents
play adopt and the rest x2 = 1 − x1 play reject. When
a low α = 0.1 is locally-observed by the agents, the
evolutionary dynamics x˙1 and x˙2 of the strategies with
respect to x1 are depicted in Fig. 5. As expected, if
α < a∗ = 0.175, then the system asymptotically con-
verges to the reject strategy, which means that the par-
ticipating agents prefer to keep their semantically di-
verse schema mappings. However, as depicted by the
evolutionary dynamics of the strategies in Fig. 6, for
α = 0.2, adopting the received advertisements that re-
sult in more qualified schema mapping is the evolu-
tionary stable strategy in the system.
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Fig. 6. Strategy evolutionary dynamics for b = 1, ca = 0.4b,
ch = 0.1b, φ0 = 0.7 and α = 0.2.
5.2. Simulation results
We simulate the running example in Section 2 with
a set of N = 40 service agents registered in one reg-
istry that employs a given schema to collectively cre-
ate a schema mapping with the schema of a second
registry. The schema mapping method employed is at-
tribute correspondences. As previously discussed, we
can reasonably assume a market increase for those
agents that reach consensus and a market decrease for
the agents that stay out. Considering the importance of
semantic agreement based on these assumptions, we
would derive the cost and benefit of interoperability
for the service agents in our simulation. In order to
make the situation more realistic, we employ two real
schemas describing business partners of SAP, namely
customer relationship management (CRM) and mas-
ter data management (MDM). A consensus thresh-
old of φ0 = 0.9 is considered by the interacting
agents for their collectively constructed schema map-
ping. We assume that the schema mapping consists
of A = 30 attribute mappings (i.e. partial mappings),
each of which is subject to advertisement by an agent.
Without loss of generality, we assume that an adver-
tised attribute mapping is made available for a limited
amount of time by the registry to all the registered ser-
vice providers. In our setting, to generate the mappings
between the schemas of the two registries, the agents
initially use AMC [30] and COMA++ [4] as two dif-
ferent mapping tools, and the mappings are given as
XML path correspondences, e.g., (schema1.path1 :
schema2.path2). A fragment of the mapping between
CRM and MDM is briefly illustrated in Fig. 7. Initially,
in each experiment, individual agents autonomously
generate an instance of the schema mapping by us-
ing the aforementioned mapping tools. Although an
Fig. 7. A fragment of the mapping between CRM and MDM.
agent is not aware of the best qualified mapping, it
can measure the relative quality of its current in-
stance of the schema mapping, as follows. The qual-
ity metric that is used in both AMC and COMA++,
is a combination of four matchers: (1) NAME that
only considers the element names, (2) PATH that
matches elements based on their hierarchical structure,
(3) PARENTS, this structural matcher only consid-
ers the parent elements to estimate the similarity be-
tween two child elements, (4) LEAVES, this structural
matcher only considers the leaf elements to estimate
the similarity between two inner elements. The qual-
ity of an attribute correspondence is the weighted av-
erage of the similarity values given by these match-
ers. For example, the calculated quality for the map-
ping (CRM.PartnerInformation.AddressInformation.
Address.AddressData.PostalAddress.PostalAddress
Data.CareOfName : MDM.Record.Addresses.
MainAddress.FaxCompleteNumber) is 0.45, and based
on the aforementioned combinatorial metric, the map-
ping (CRM.PartnerInformation.AddressInformation.
Address.AddressData.PostalAddress.PostalAddress
Data.CareOfName : MDM.Record.Addresses.
MainAddress.CareOfName) would obviously have
a higher quality of 0.82. The output of AMC and
COMA++ is a list of attribute correspondences and
their similarity scores. Although both AMC and
COMA++ use the same matching components (i.e.
NAME, PATH, PARENTS, LEAVES), the overall
quality (i.e confidence values) of these tools is differ-
ent, because, for the different components, different
heuristic functions are used. In our experimental setup,
each agent calculates the overall quality of his local
schema mapping as a weighted average of the scores
of its individual attribute correspondences, whereas
the weights are different for different agents. There-
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fore, the agents do not have to converge to the same
schema mapping. However, note that this quality met-
ric is monotonic to the score of any individual con-
stituent attribute correspondence.
We perform each experiment in a number of rounds.
In each round, each agent decides whether or not to
take the risk of advertising an attribute mapping of its
current schema mapping, according to the advertise-
ments that it has seen in a specific time window of size
w; the size of window can be specified in terms of a
number of rounds or a number of received advertise-
ments. Also, each agent decides on whether to adopt
or reject a received advertisement on an attribute map-
ping, if using it results in a higher quality of its local
schema mapping than it current has.
In each experiment, we evaluate the Precision [13]
of the schema mapping instances of different service
agents at each round. The best qualified overall schema
mapping is defined as a perfect set of mappings, pro-
vided by an expert. Precision expresses the proportion
of correct mappings in the schema mapping instance of
an agent, as compared to the mappings provided by the
expert. Hence, this metric can capture the relative qual-
ity of the current instance to the best qualified schema
mapping. The average quality per round is illustrated
to investigate the emergence rate of the desired seman-
tic interoperability.
We perform all the experiments for homogeneous
and heterogeneous agents (in terms of costs and ben-
efit) as well. We illustrate the effect of changing each
individual parameter of our model, while keeping the
other parameters fixed. We present the results of the
homogeneous and heterogeneous settings together for
each experiment; the values of the parameters in the
homogeneous setting are considered as the mean val-
ues of respective parameters in the corresponding het-
erogeneous setting.
The main purpose of the following simulation ex-
periments is to investigate the emergence of semantic
interoperability and the convergence rate of it. Hence,
the cost and benefit parameters in the homogeneous
setting or their mean value in the heterogeneous setting
are set so that the necessary condition (previously de-
rived through the performed analysis) for establishing
the consensus is provided. However, we also demon-
strate in the first experiment that if the necessary con-
dition does not hold, there is no consensus on the qual-
ity of the schema mapping, as we expected.
First, we investigate the decision process of adop-
tion in the set of autonomous agents. As the ratio of
γ , which is defined in Eq. (4), is the determining pa-
Fig. 8. The effect of increasing γ for cadv = 0.1ca , A = 30,
N = 40, φ0 = 0.9, and in the heterogeneous setting, γ¯ = 0.25.
Fig. 9. The evolution of the expected value of α for cadv = 0.1ca ,
A = 30, N = 40, φ0 = 0.9, and in the heterogeneous setting,
γ¯ = 0.25.
rameter for the adoption decision of agents, we keep
the advertisement cost cadv constant and run the ex-
periment for different values of γ . To investigate the
convergence rate to emergence of consensus, the aver-
age quality (precision) per round is illustrated in Fig. 8.
As we expected, if γ is greater than a specific thresh-
old (e.g., for a higher adoption cost ca), the necessary
condition for establishing the consensus is not satis-
fied. In this case, each agent prefers to keep its cur-
rent schema mapping instead of adopting more qual-
ified partial mappings, hence the improvement in the
average quality of the schema mapping is insignificant
(e.g., see Fig. 8 for γ = 0.3). As experimentally found,
the γ threshold is between 0.25 and 0.3, which is close
to our analytical prediction. Also, the minimum qual-
ity α of the schema mapping is approximately 0.65, as
depicted in Fig. 9. Thus, according to our analysis, and
specifically Eq. (9), only a value of γ lower than 0.286
would result in the convergence of the schema quality
to φ0 = 0.9 or, equivalently, in the emergence of se-
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Fig. 10. The effect of increasing advertisement cost for b = 1,
ca = ch = 0.1b, A = 30, N = 40, φ0 = 0.9, and in the heteroge-
neous setting, c¯adv = 0.1c¯a .
mantic interoperability. To scrutinize the results of this
set of experiments, we also plot the evolution of the
expected value of α for each experiment separately in
Fig. 9. It is clearly illustrated in the figure that the se-
quential increments in the expected value of α satisfies
the stated condition in Eq. (13) for low-enough values
of γ . Therefore, the sufficient condition for reaching
the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is satisfied for γ values
lower than 0.286, as discussed in Section 4.3.
Next, we investigate the decision process of adver-
tisement for the individual agents. To this end, as illus-
trated in Fig. 10, we keep the benefit, the adoption cost
and the heterogeneity cost constant, and we vary the
advertisement cost in different runs of the experiment.
As experimentally shown (see Fig. 10), the higher the
advertisement cost is, the longer the time is to reach
the same average quality of the schema mapping, as
a smaller number of agents decide to take the risk of
advertising. It is clear that, although not illustrated, for
a relatively high cost of advertisement, there would be
no consensus on the quality of the schema mapping,
because the agents would avoid advertising their par-
tial mappings altogether, as we expected by Eq. (5).
We are also interested in seeing the effect of chang-
ing the parameter w on the convergence rate; recall that
w is the size of a window in which the received adver-
tisements are considered for estimating the global con-
sensus level reached in the process of decision making
according to Eq. (11). The size of a window is defined
in terms of the number of service agents from whom
an individual agent receives advertisements. In order
to explicitly model the limited scope of advertisements
through local communication of service agents, w is
expressed as a fraction {0.4,0.2,0.1} of N in these ex-
periments. As depicted in Fig. 11, the establishment
Fig. 11. The effect of increasing w for b = 0.4, ca = ch = 0.25b,
cadv = 0.1ca , A = 30, N = 40, φ0 = 0.9, and in the heterogeneous
setting, w¯ = 0.3.
Fig. 12. The effect of increasing the number of participating agents
for b = 0.4, ca = ch = 0.25b, cadv = 0.1ca , A = 30, φ0 = 0.9.
of consensus is guaranteed, even if a service agent
only exchanges advertisements with a fraction of other
agents. As the fraction of participating agents with
whom a service agent communicates increases, the
convergence rate increases as well, as expected.
Finally, we investigate the scalability of the pro-
posed strategy by increasing the number N of par-
ticipating service agents (Fig. 12) and the number A
of constituent attributes of their schema (Fig. 13) in
two different sets of experiments. It should be noted
that in a realistic setting, the amount of information
that becomes available to an agent through local adver-
tisements is not necessarily proportional to the num-
ber of participating agents. Therefore, in these experi-
ments, we decrease w when increasing N , so that the
number of advertisements locally received by other
agents remains constant. As demonstrated in Figs 12
and 13, semantic interoperability emerges with an ac-
ceptable convergence rate, even under this commu-
nication constraint, yet requires more rounds, as ex-
pected.
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Fig. 13. The effect of increasing the number of attributes for b = 0.4,
ca = ch = 0.25b, cadv = 0.1ca , N = 40, φ0 = 0.9, and in the
heterogeneous setting, A = 80.
6. Related work
Due to the importance of interoperability as a nec-
essary requirement of many real-world applications of
multi-agent systems, this generic problem has been
studied in various contexts. For example, some studies
[29,33] focus on norm emergence, which addresses our
problem in a very general form, as they study a type
of multi-agent agreement process in which agents con-
verge to a common strategy in a variety of situations.
In a more specific form, the problem of semantic
agreement has also been thoroughly studied. A number
of studies deal with semantic interoperability through
the evolution of a common ontology or a global
schema based on the cooperation of distributed partic-
ipants [31,35,37]. However, the assumption of a com-
mon ontology is often too strong or unrealistic in co-
operative multi-agent systems, as argued by [2]. There
exist different approaches that enable the agents to
keep their ontologies while improving their interop-
erability. For example to support the communication
among heterogeneous agents, the authors in [11] pro-
pose an approach in which the agents gradually build
towards a semantically integrated system by exchang-
ing their individual ontological information on an as-
need basis. Another approach is proposed by [2], in
which the agents use machine-learning techniques to
learn new concepts from other agents through instance
examples to improve their communication - hence -
cooperation abilities. A more practical approach is pre-
sented in [34] for the cases where there is not a suffi-
cient number of instances shared by the agents. Their
distributed approach for the creation and the dissem-
ination of new concepts allows individual ontologies
of the agents to evolve cooperatively, but according
to the results of their own queries. Similarly, in our
proposed approach for improving the interoperabil-
ity of the agents, we avoid the assumption of com-
mon ontology. By taking this approach, whereas the
agents are able to keep their individual schema or on-
tology by making use of the mappings between dif-
ferent schemas or ontologies, these mappings are not
necessarily the same and their quality is improved by
the rational participation of every agent.
According to [1], in order to reach agreements on
common interpretations, the state of semantic inter-
operability as an emergent phenomenon depends on
the efficiency of the conducted negotiations. Thus, the
main concern in other studies is how to develop ne-
gotiation mechanisms, in order to establish a consen-
sus on ontology/schema mappings used by distributed
autonomous participants [26,27]. For example, the au-
thors in [27] and [26] propose to use value-based ar-
gumentation frameworks [8] to deal with conduct-
ing negotiations between distributed agents who use
different ontologies, in order to reach an agreement
over ontology mappings. This is achieved by using
an argumentation process in which candidate map-
pings are accepted or rejected, based on the ontologi-
cal knowledge and the agents preferences. As opposed
to these approaches, we take into account the rational-
ity of agents in the emergence of the consensus on the
schema mappings. Such rationality is naturally preva-
lent in the collaboration of independent business enti-
ties and has to be dealt with.
Another line of research employs distributed coordi-
nation for achieving semantic interoperability. For ex-
ample, the authors in [36] propose setting up a semiotic
dynamics that achieves this coordination. The agents
self-organize an interlingua with labels whose seman-
tics (i.e. the meanings of their underlying categories)
are coordinated among the agents without central coor-
dination. Whereas, in our case, not all the agents nec-
essarily converge to the same semantic mappings, yet
they can reach an agreement by establishing a consen-
sus on quality of the schema mapping. In [7], the au-
thors analyze a dynamic model known as the Nam-
ing Game and discuss that it is able to account for the
distributed coordination of autonomous agents and the
emergence of global agreement. Aiming at defining the
microscopic behavior of the agents in emergence of
shared vocabularies, the authors in [6] study semiotic
dynamics of a similar model to [7]. They show that the
model exhibits the same phenomena as observed in hu-
man semiotic dynamics, specifically a period of prepa-
ration followed by a rather sharp transition into global
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coordination. These developed models, however, can-
not be applied in the context of establishing consensus
on the quality of a schema mapping that we deal with
in the present paper, because they involve two-way
pairwise interactions, a different mapping quality veri-
fication method, and a different end of game.In a more
generic setting, the authors in [19] address the problem
of coordination in multi-agent systems for Collective
Iterative Allocation. Using various individual agents
proposals which are based on their estimations of the
performance of different teams, a team is selected for
a given task. The selection is based on group decision
policies, where each agent contributes (e.g., through
proposing) to the decision as to which team should be
selected for a given task. After a team is selected and
executes the task, they progressively develop a better
understanding of the true performance of teams which
is taken into account in subsequent allocations. As one
of the important directions for future improvement of
the algorithm, the authors have mentioned that they re-
quire an evaluation of the communication requirement
of the agents. In our developed decentralized strategy
of coordination, we have addressed this issue by tak-
ing into account the communication requirement of the
agents.
Overall, whereas most of the aforementioned ap-
proaches focus on developing different techniques in
order to establish interoperability, we shift our atten-
tion to investigate under which conditions semantic in-
teroperability emerges. Strictly speaking, we take into
account the situations in which agents have different
costs and benefits for being involved in the establish-
ment of the consensus on schema/ontology mappings
and each agent tries to maximize its own utility. In the
context of collaborative data sharing, one of the studies
[38] has addressed semantic interoperability in a very
similar setting to the sample scenario of our work. Al-
though, the proposed decision making approach in [38]
is predicated on static individual-based policies for the
participants (to adopt or reject updates), whereas we
develop a rational and dynamic decision making pro-
cess for achieving consensus on the schema mapping
qualities among the participating agents.
Finally, the game which is modeled and analyzed in
this paper is closely related with the social dilemma
occurring in public good or critical mass situations,
in the literature of economic sciences. Although the
qualitative dynamics of public good or critical mass
games have been fully analyzed [21,25], they have
some shortcomings as potential solutions for the emer-
gence of semantic interoperability. As an important in-
stance, they are not concerned with the heterogeneous
motivations of individual participants (in terms of their
cost and benefit) for being involved in the emergence
process of establishing interoperability. Also, [18,20]
aim to improve the odds for the implementation of the
public good through some form of commitment (which
is costly when it is fake) or deposit on behalf of the
agents prior to the public good game. The purpose of
that work is to discourage various free-riding strategies
either by avoiding playing the game with free-riders
or by restricting access to the public good for free-
riders. As compared to [18,20], we do not consider
prior commitment of agents for contributing to the
public good, as such a setting often requires monetary
transfers among agents. However, some sort of prior
expression of interest on behalf of the agents would be
indeed needed in reality for initiating the whole pro-
cess of reaching semantic agreement. Note that, in our
case, non-contributors (i.e., those that do not adopt or
advertise partial mappings) are self-restricted from ac-
cessing the public good, i.e., they cannot free-ride, be-
cause each agent constructs the public good locally
through some costly effort, as opposed to the work in
[18,20].
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have employed a game-theoretic
approach to analyze the dynamics of bottom-up (i.e.
through agent interaction) emergence of semantic in-
teroperability in a distributed setting of rational agents.
We analytically found that semantic emergence can
arise, even as an evolutionary stable equilibrium, if
certain conditions hold regarding the communication
cost, the cost of technological adaptation, the expected
mutual benefit from interoperability, as well as the ex-
pected loss from isolation. Our analysis significantly
improves the understanding of the rational dynamics
involved in an agreement bottom-up emergence pro-
cess and explains that interoperability, in general, apart
from being a challenging technical problem, also has
economic implications in order to emerge. Our sim-
ulation experiments verify our analysis and demon-
strate the emergence of semantic interoperability in re-
alistic settings. Note that we have made some simpli-
fying assumptions, such as the linear relationship be-
tween the quality of a schema mapping and the con-
sensus, or considering an average benefit and cost for
all agents in our evolutionary dynamics analysis. Al-
though these assumptions might avoid some difficul-
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ties of real life, they enable us to employ more en-
riched analytical tools for scrutinizing a simple for-
mal model in a domain that needs more attention and
to gain insights that can be applied to the more com-
plex situations. For future work, we plan to study
different cases of bottom-up semantic interoperabil-
ity emergence where limited communication among
agents employing different schemas is possible, e.g.,
storage clouds.
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